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*J.B.L. 313 Introduction
Large corporations wield huge power and influence. In many instances senior officers within such
companies are closely allied to the government of the day. Their views, and arguably preferences, aid
ministerial decisions and influence policy.1 Consequently, the freedom to criticise these corporations
is fundamental within a democratically functioning society. According to Baroness Hale in Jameel v
Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl 2 (Jameel), the ability to criticise large companies is at least as
important in a democracy as criticising government.3
However, it is submitted that the state of our economy, and the socio-economic mobilisation of
communities (the continued social and economic performance of a community), is dependent upon
the success of such corporations.4 In turn, the success of a corporation, in most cases, is inextricably
linked to its reputation.5 Indeed, as is submitted below in the second section, the importance of
corporate reputation is both explicitly and implicitly enshrined within the Companies Act 2006.
The Defamation Act 2013 came into force on January 1, 2014. According to the Libel Reform
Campaign the purpose of the new legislation is to address the "chilling effect" created by pre-2013 Act
libel law, which imposed "unnecessary and disproportionate restrictions on free speech", and did not
"reflect the interests of a modern democratic society".6 On receiving Royal Assent in April 2013, the
Act was subject to much fanfare from elements of the British media.7 Indeed, Lord McNally, the
Minister responsible for implementing the Act, "emphasised that it should be understood as only part
of a wider array of measures oriented towards *J.B.L. 314 improving the functioning of the public
sphere."8 During a House of Lords debate in October 2012, Lord McNally suggested that his "intention
… has always been to end up with legislation that works".9
Section 1(1) of the 2013 Act has introduced a new test of actual or likely serious harm. This is
qualified further for claimants that trade for profit by s.1(2), in that harm to reputation is not serious
unless it has caused, or is likely to cause, serious financial loss. This article explores whether, in the
case of corporate claimants, where reputation is a valuable asset linked to the financial performance
of the company, the s.1(1) and 1(2) provisions may have swung the pendulum too far in favour of
defendants and, in seeking to address an "inequality of arms"10 in favour of corporations, this could
undermine the value of corporate reputation.
This article will, first, contextualise corporate reputation as a valuable commercial asset; secondly,
consider whether, as the law stood before the Defamation Act 2013, there was an inequality of arms;
thirdly, analyse what the requirement of serious harm and the qualification of serious financial loss
may mean in practice for corporate claimants, and the right to reputation. Specifically, through the
lens of Tesla Motors Ltd v BBC,11 this article considers potential causation issues that corporate
claimants may encounter when attempting to establish actual or likely serious harm arising from
actual or likely serious financial loss, and consequently, questions whether this may result in an
increase in applications by defendants for statements of case to be struck out in accordance with
CPR 3.4, and for summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24. Ultimately, in response to Lord McNally’s
statement, it raises the question: "who does the new legislation work for?"
Contextualising corporate reputation
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In Jameel, Lord Hoffmann, in his dissenting judgment, articulated the difference between corporate
reputation and the reputation of a natural person:
"In the case of an individual, his reputation is a part of his personality, the ‘immortal part’ of himself
and it is right that he should be entitled to vindicate his reputation and receive compensation for a slur
upon it without proof of financial loss. But a commercial company has no soul and its reputation is no
more than a commercial asset, something attached to its trading name which brings in customers." 12
Although there is a clearly recognised distinction between the reputation of a corporation and that of
an individual, defining corporate reputation is not easy.13 This is reflected in the myriad of ways in
which it has been described. For example, corporate reputation is considered to be a
"multi-stakeholder concept that is *J.B.L. 315 reflected in the perceptions that stakeholders have of
an organisation".14 It has also been defined as the "perceptual representation of a company’s past
actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to all of its key constituents when
compared with other leading rivals".15
Post devised three concepts, or "social foundations", of reputation16 which have filtered into the law of
defamation.17 These foundations include dignity, property and honour. Reputation as dignity is not
applicable to corporations.18 As Lord Hoffmann said in Jameel, a corporation has no soul19 and,
therefore, cannot feel any loss of dignity.20 Thus, this concept only applies to the reputation of a
natural person. However, Post’s concepts of reputation as honour and reputation as property are
potentially applicable to corporate defamation. This is certainly the case with reputation as property.
Post argues that the manifestation of this concept provides a vehicle through which corporations can
sue in defamation.21 Therefore, both concepts require more detailed consideration.
Reputation as honour exists through an individual’s identification with the "normative characteristics"
of the fulfilment of social roles within their community and the value their community places on those
roles.22 Unlike reputation as property, it is not earned through hard work. Instead it derives from the
value placed upon the respective role by the individual’s community.23 Chan argues that although the
case law supporting this concept is predominantly linked to the reputation of members of the upper
class, politicians and public officials,24 the concept is not, necessarily, inapplicable to corporations.25
Chan accepts that a free capitalist market in which trading corporations operate conflicts with a
"deference" society based on honour, as advocated by Milo.26 However, the developing importance
placed by corporations upon corporate social responsibility (CSR)27 means that companies involved
with not-for-profit CSR activities may well be regarded as having reputation as honour,28 as such
activities are used to increase market value and *J.B.L. 316 financial performance through gains in
reputation and legitimacy.29 Indeed, the Reputation Institute30 uses a model known as RepTrak, and a
measurement tool called RepTrak Pulse, to place a value on reputation through a scoring system that
is driven by attributes, centred around dimensions, that describe the common platform through which
most companies build reputation.31 Thus, the RepTrak reports link reputation to specific corporate
"activities". According to the 2013 CSR RepTrak 100 Report, 73 per of 55,000 consumers surveyed
were willing to recommend companies perceived to be delivering on CSR. This high level of support is
in distinct contrast to companies at the other end of the spectrum, where only 17 per cent of
consumers are willing to recommend a company perceived as poorly delivering on its CSR.32
A prime example of the importance placed on CSR by companies is Business in the Community
(BITC),33 an international business-led charitable organisation that was founded in 1982 by a number
of multinational companies in response to the 1981 Brixton and Toxteth riots.34 The charity brands
itself as a "business movement committed to transforming business and transforming communities"
by helping member companies to manage their CSR activity.35 Members of the charity predominantly
consist of FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and Fortune 500 companies.36 One of the key drivers for becoming a
member of the charity is improving brand value and reputation.37 The charity cites case studies
involving companies such as the Co-operative Group38 and Pachacuti39 to illustrate the correlation
between effective implementation of CSR strategies and increased brand value. The fact that so
many major corporations are involved with such an established CSR movement illustrates the nexus
between CSR and reputation, attained through "the fulfilment of social roles", manifested in CSR
activity linked to the environment and conservation, education, sustainability, community development
and socio-economic mobilisation. *J.B.L. 317
This argument is supported by both s.172(1)(d) and (e) of the Companies Act 2006. Section 172(1)(e)
states that a company director’s duty to promote the success of the company includes "the desirability
of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct". Although Professor
Keay describes this as a "vague requirement", he acknowledges that it is highly desirable for a
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company to be regarded as credible and trustworthy, and to be seen as maintaining high standards of
conduct.40 It is submitted that the 2013 CSR RepTrak 100 Report data, and the success of
organisations such as BITC, as referred to above, demonstrate a clear correlation between a
company’s CSR activity and it being regarded as credible, trustworthy and, at least visibly, conducting
itself in accordance with such standards. This correlation is underlined further by s.172(1)(d), which
requires directors to take into account "the impact of the company’s operations on the community and
the environment". Although, as Carney states, the notion of "community" is, potentially, amorphous,41
it can be regarded as including the people, businesses and institutions located in the vicinity within
which the company is based.42 According to Professor Keay, having regard for the community
"might manifest itself in a number of ways, such as a donation to a local cause or refraining from
actions which might deleteriously affect the community … [D]irectors … have to justify any such
action as enhancing the success of the company. This does not … mean that success has to be
reduced to monetary terms. Having an input in the community might be seen as contributing to the
success of the company as a respected local firm, and part of its role as a good citizen. This might
enhance its reputation, which could arguably contribute to the company’s success43 … [To the
contrary a] company might decline to take on a project that despite being potentially profitable could
alienate the local or wider community and lead to the entity being derided, and see its reputation
diminish." 44
Therefore, it is submitted that reputation as honour is a legitimate vehicle through which a corporate
defamation claim can be brought. Additionally, BITC works closely with the government45 to advise on
and influence, the UK’s CSR agenda. The fact that a collection of large multinational companies can,
through a charitable group, such as BITC, influence government policy, legitimises the concept of
reputation as honour being used to both criticise a corporation46 and for a corporation to sue in
defamation.
Post advances the argument that the concept of reputation as property is reputation in the
marketplace; a notion of reputation that: "can be understood as a form of intangible property akin to
goodwill … acquired as result of an individual’s efforts and labour".47 According to Post, there are
*J.B.L. 318
"aspects of modern defamation law that can be understood only by reference to the concept of
reputation as property, as, for example, the fact that corporations and other inanimate entities can sue
for defamation." 48
This proposition is supported by Oster, who, in light of the arguments advanced above surrounding
CSR (it is submitted, rather too narrowly), argues that corporate reputation is based only on
reputation as property, as opposed to dignity and honour.49 The right of corporations to reputation as
property has been recognised in the jurisprudence of the English courts and Strasbourg. The right
received judicial approval in Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus v Hawkins,50 where Pollock CB adjudged
that a company could sue for a libel "by which its property is injured".51 In Dixon v Holden 52 an
injunction was granted to prevent an allegation, that the claimant was the partner in a bankrupt firm,
being published. Sir R. Malins VC stated:
"What is property? One man has property in lands, another in goods, another in a business, another
in skill, another in reputation; and whatever may have the effect of destroying property in any one of
these things (even in a man’s good name) is, in my opinion, destroying property of a most valuable
description." 53
The European Court of Human Rights also recognised the right in Van Marle v Netherlands, in that
the right to goodwill could be regarded as property for the purposes of art.1 of Protocol 1 ECHR.54 If,
as has been argued by Smythe et al., a corporation’s values are kept alive in a collective memory of
its behaviour,55 the concept of reputation as property "acquired as a result of a company’s efforts and
labour in the marketplace" is applicable to trading-for-profit corporations. Additionally, Chan submits
that non-trading corporations, such as charities and social enterprises, should also be entitled to
protect their corporate reputation by suing in defamation through the vehicle of reputation as property.
The premise of the submission lies in the fact that non-trading corporations expend effort and labour
to gain, maintain and develop respective reputations. Just because a corporation is not trading for
profit does not mean that damage to its reputation would not detrimentally impact upon it. For
example, according to Chan, it could adversely affect its ability to recruit suitable employees and
obtain property and facilities.56 Sequentially, this may impact upon its ability to fulfil its purpose.
*J.B.L. 319 57
Page3
Despite the varied definitions and conceptualisations of corporate reputation, whatever is subscribed
to, there is no doubt that reputation is valuable. As Lord Hoffmann stated above, corporate reputation
is an asset which attracts customers.58 In the same case, Lord Bingham, Lord Hope and Lord Scott all
agreed that reputation is a thing of value,59 and, in Dixon v Holden, it was held that reputation is
potentially more valuable than other property.60 Ultimately, a company’s reputation is an asset that
requires constant care to ensure that it develops positively from generation to generation.61
The following part of this section attempts to illustrate the "value" of corporate reputation as an asset,
by providing modern contextual examples of its importance to a successful company.62
According to the Reputation Institute’s 2014 Global RepTrak 100 Report,63 the Walt Disney Company
and Google are the world’s joint most reputable companies, with a pulse score of 77.3,64 in the UK,
John Lewis enjoyed the best corporate reputation, with a score of 87.68.65 The report recognises a
clear link between reputation and consumer support for a product or service, thus, for instance, a
score of 70–79 translates into 60 per cent of consumers willing to buy the product or use the service.
66 The 2013 UK RepTrak Pulse report illustrates how a negative story can impact upon a company’s
reputation, as the horsemeat scandal saw Tesco’s reputation decline by 11.65 points from 2012.67
Arguably the most explicit and obvious way to evaluate and quantify the value of reputation as
property, and, potentially, honour, to corporations is through examples of incidents that have
damaged reputations, and have, consequently, had an impact on financial performance.68 Two
relatively recent incidents, concerning multinational companies, illustrate this point. Group 4 Security
(G4S) saw a 2 per cent fall in the value of its shares as a result of its handling of the security contract
for the London 2012 Olympics.69 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion
in 2010, and subsequent oil spill,70 BP spent $90 million on public relations to *J.B.L. 320 attempt to
improve its damaged reputation.71 Clearly, this incident impacted upon BP’s reputation as property.
Arguably, however, it also affected its reputation as honour, as BP is a member of BITC, and a key
proponent of the CSR movement.72 Incidentally, Transocean, the company that owned and operated
the Deepwater Horizon rig, experienced a 14 per cent fall in share value.73 Although this method of
analysis garnered support during the House of Commons Parliamentary Debates on the Defamation
Bill,74 and enjoys Court of Appeal authority,75 as can be seen below,76 it is subject to conflicting
schools of thought as to its accuracy and reliability.
The pre-Defamation Act 2013 landscape
Since Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd 77 (Derbyshire) it has been accepted that
corporate public authorities78 cannot sue in defamation in relation to governmental and administrative
functions, as this could result in criticism of the government being stifled; a position that does not
accord with a free democratic society, public interest79 and, it is submitted, inherently, the right to
freedom of expression. However, it is established doctrine that, under English law, commercial
corporations are entitled to sue for defamation,80 a position reaffirmed by Lord Keith in Derbyshire,
and maintained, albeit with qualification, by the Defamation Act 2013.81 In his Lordship’s judgment
"a trading corporation is entitled to sue in respect of defamatory matters which can be seen as having
a tendency to damage it in the way of its business. Examples are those that go to credit such as
might deter banks from lending to it, or to the conditions experienced by its employees, which might
impede the recruitment of the best qualified workers, or make people reluctant to deal with it." 82
Despite the Defamation Acts of 1952 and 1996, and the recommendations in the Report of the Faulks
Committee on Defamation in 1975,83 no statutory definition *J.B.L. 321 of the tort existed prior to the
Defamation Act 2013.84 To the contrary, defamation has been shaped and defined by common law. In
Parmiter v Coupland 85 it was held that defamation constituted "[a] publication, without justification or
lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred,
contempt or ridicule".86 The next stage in the tort’s development emanated from the Court of Appeal in
Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd,87 It was held that although the film88 did not
expose the claimant to the Parmiter v Coupland test of "hatred, contempt or ridicule", the link which
could be made by audiences between the claimant and the fictional events depicted caused her to be
shunned and avoided by others. Thus, it was held that the claimant’s reputation had been defamed.
The ambit of defamation was extended again in Sim v Stretch,89 in which Lord Atkin stated that the
Parmiter v Coupland test was too narrow,90 instead his Lordship restated the test as: "would the
words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?"91
Essentially, under the common law regime, the claimant must satisfy the following tests to be
successful: prove that the imputation was defamatory92: that it identifies the claimant93; that it was
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communicated to at least one other person than the claimant94; and that the imputation tends to: (a)
expose the claimant to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or be shunned or avoided by others,95 or (b) lower
the claimant in the estimation of ordinary right thinking people.96 Under common law, a corporation
trading for profit can sue a defendant for defamation where it alleged that its trading or business
reputation was attacked.97 The Defamation Act 2013 has not altered the position that a company can
sue in defamation, but it has affected the ability to do so, as is discussed below.
Prior to the 2013 Act coming into force, corporations that made successful defamation claims could
recover substantial damages without the need to prove special damage.98 The ability of corporations
to sue in defamation, and recover such damages, had long been the source of debate, owing to the
apparent conflict with the right to freedom of expression, pursuant to art.10, and, inherently, the public
interest. Indeed, Baroness Hale, in her dissenting judgment in Jameel, stated that requiring a
corporate claimant to prove special damage
"would achieve a proper balance between the right of a company to protect its reputation and the right
of the press and public to be critical of it. These *J.B.L. 322 days, the dividing line between
governmental and non-governmental organisations is increasingly difficult to draw. The power wielded
by the major multi-national corporations is enormous and growing. The freedom to criticise them may
be at least as important in a democratic society as the freedom to criticise government." 99
Baroness Hale’s judgment is reflected in the Libel Reform Campaign’s report "Free Speech is not for
Sale", which argues that "not everything deserves a reputation". The report recommended the
exemption of large and medium-sized corporations from suing in defamation unless it could prove
malicious falsehood.100 The Ministry of Justice, in a pre-2013 Act consultation paper,101 recognised
that where a company sues an individual or non-governmental organisation there may be an
"inequality of arms"102 between the parties, which is used to stifle criticism of the claimant company’s
behaviour through the threat of protracted and costly legal proceedings.103 According to the paper,
even large media organisations could find the cost of such proceedings prohibitive, therefore
detrimentally impacting upon public interest reporting.104 However, the Ministry’s concern regarding
the erosion of public interest reporting resonates with a contrary, yet arguably more balanced, view
from the European Court of Human Rights. In its judgment in Steel and Morris v United Kingdom 105
the European Court recognised that just because the claimant was a large multinational company it
should not be deprived of a right to defend itself against alleged defamatory statements:
"In addition to the public interest in open debate about business practices, there is a competing
interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of companies, for the benefit of
shareholders and employees, but also for the wider economic good." 106
According to the European Court, the state is subject to a margin of appreciation as to the means it
provides under domestic law to enable a company to challenge the truth, and limit the damage, of
allegations which risk harming its reputation.107 Thus, there is undoubtedly a judicially recognised
public interest in the activity *J.B.L. 323 and practice of a company being open to criticism.108
However, there is also an equally strong public interest in allowing companies to protect their
commercial assets. Ultimately, a company’s reputation is inextricably linked to its financial
performance, which, in turn, when considering reputation as property, can impact upon the economy,
and, if applying reputation as honour, the environment, education and socio-economic mobilisation.
In order to adjust the "inequality of arms" between corporate claimants and non-corporate defendants,
identified by the Ministry of Justice in its consultation paper,109 the Ministry recommended the
introduction of a "substantial harm’" requirement into the Draft Defamation Bill, in that the statement
complained of is not defamatory, unless it caused substantial harm to the claimant’s reputation.110
However, it did not approve of the introduction of a requirement that, in order to demonstrate
"substantial harm", corporations have to prove financial loss.111 The paper articulated the concern that
such a requirement would lead to delays in commencing proceedings as a result of corporate
claimant’s frontloading costs. The Defamation Act 2013 received Royal Assent, amid much fanfare
from elements of the British media,112 on April 25, 2013. Rather than "substantial harm", the Act
includes a "serious harm" requirement. On April 24, 2013 the Government introduced a qualification
for this requirement, in that, to meet the serious harm threshold, corporations trading for profit need to
demonstrate serious financial loss.113 Although included late, this qualification was enshrined within
the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2014. The following section looks at what the serious
harm requirement, and the serious financial loss qualification, may mean for corporate claimants.
The Defamation Act 2013—"serious harm" and "serious financial loss"
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Despite the Ministry’s forewarning regarding the introduction of the "substantial harm" requirement,
demonstrated by financial loss, the Act incorporates a new test of "serious harm" as follows: pursuant
to s.1(1):
"A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to
the reputation of the claimant."
For a claimant to successfully sue a defendant for defamation under the common law regime multiple
tests had to be satisfied.114 Section 1 adds a further layer. Under the new regime a claimant is
required to demonstrate that the words complained *J.B.L. 324 of: (i) caused, or are likely to cause,
serious harm to the claimant’s reputation; and (ii) tend to: (a) expose the claimant to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or; cause the claimant to be shunned and avoided by others115; or (b) lowers the claimant
in the estimation of ordinary right-thinking people.116
For claimants trading for profit, the serious harm requirement is qualified further, by s.1(2), which
states:
"For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit is not ‘serious
harm’ unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss."
This qualification means that corporate claimants need to specify in their Particulars of Claim: (i) that
the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious financial loss; (ii) particulars of
the loss incurred, and how this has been caused by the defamatory statement(s); and (iii) why the
loss incurred is serious.
Actual or likely serious harm
"Serious harm" and "serious financial loss" are not defined or explained explicitly by the Act. For the
sake of an individual claimant, there is no guidance on the mechanism for measuring serious harm.
For the corporate claimant, there is the same dearth of guidance for serious financial loss.117
However, as set out below, limited guidance on what is meant by serious harm can be obtained from
the common law definitions of defamation and abuse of process, the House of Commons’ debates
surrounding the insertion of the term into the Draft Defamation Bill, and judicial interpretation of the
test in Cooke and Midland Heart Ltd v MGN Ltd and Trinity Mirror Midlands Ltd.118
In Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd 119 Tugendhat J identified Lord Atkin’s test from Sim v
Stretch,120 whether the words would "tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking
members of society generally",121 as authority for establishing a threshold of seriousness122:
"[W]hatever definition of ‘defamatory’ is adopted, it must include a qualification or threshold of
seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims." 123
Incidentally, the jurisprudence surrounding the strike-out of claims for abuse of process in the context
of potentially defamatory publications also provides some guidance.124 In Dow Jones & Co v Jameel
125 it was held that a form of abuse of process exists where it can be established that the benefit
attainable by the claimant *J.B.L. 325 is disproportionate to the cost of the legal proceedings.
Therefore, there needs to be a real and substantial wrong.126 Consequently, the Explanatory Notes to
the Act state that the serious harm test "builds on the consideration given by the courts in a series of
cases to the question of what is sufficient to establish that a statement is defamatory".127
In its Draft Defamation Bill consultation paper128 the Ministry of Justice recommended the inclusion of
a substantial harm requirement, in that the statement complained of is not defamatory unless it
caused substantial harm to the claimant’s reputation.129 According to the Lord Chancellor, the new
test of serious harm "nudges up" this threshold by a "modest extent"130 and is drafted to allow the
court to consider all the relevant circumstances of the case.131 Cooke provided the first opportunity for
judicial interpretation of the s.1(1) test.132 In this case the court was concerned with determining the
meaning of "has caused" as opposed to "is likely to cause" serious harm.133 Bean J considered the
drafting history of s.1(1) and, unsurprisingly, observed that serious harm involved a higher threshold
than substantial harm and that, as stated in the Explanatory Notes, this "raises the bar over which a
claimant must jump".134 The extent to which the bar was raised proved more difficult to ascertain. The
claimants relied on the modest extent observation.135 However, the judge was of the opinion that this
statement was inadmissible, stating that the words "serious harm" were sufficiently clear, taken in
their ordinary meaning. Consequently, there was no ambiguity that would trigger engagement of the
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rule in Pepper v Hart.136 Finally, Bean J considered how serious harm might be proved, stating:
"I do not accept that in every case evidence will be required to satisfy the serious harm test. Some
statements are so obviously likely to cause serious harm to a person’s reputation that this likelihood
can be inferred. If a national newspaper with a large circulation wrongly accuses someone of being a
terrorist or a paedophile, then in either case (putting to one side for the moment the question of a
prompt and prominent apology) the likelihood of serious harm to reputation is plain, even if the
individual’s family and friends knew the allegation to be untrue. In such a case the matter would be
taken no further by requiring the claimant to incur the expense of commissioning an opinion poll
survey, or to produce a selection of comments from the blogosphere which might in any event be
unrepresentative of the population of ‘right thinking people’ generally." 137
It is submitted that Bean J’s interpretation of serious harm, and how it can be proved, sheds no more
light on the test than the limited guidance already provided. *J.B.L. 326 Despite rejection at common
law,138 the claimants’ arguments to the contrary and, although not applied in this case, the judgment
leave open the possibility of a sophisticated analytical approach to determine serious harm in cases
where harm is "less obvious". However, as is discussed below, adducing such evidence could prove
extremely problematic, especially in light of the fact that no guidance is given as to "what" evidence
could be adduced to overcome the serious harm threshold. Although the judgment suggests that
"serious harm" is more serious than "substantial harm" it does not provide any indication as to how
much higher the bar is raised for claimants. The fact that Bean J felt the language to be clear enough
so as not to consider the "modest extent" observation is surprising, particularly in light of that fact that
the relationship with the approach taken at common law, as set out above, was not explored at all.
Consequently, it seems, taking into account the inference that sufficient evidence must now be
adduced in some, less obvious, cases, the bar is, potentially, set considerably higher than the pre-Act
debates suggested.
Two further elements of Bean J’s judgment have potentially serious ramifications for corporate
claimants, particularly if considered together. First, in assessing the likelihood of serious harm being
caused to the claimant’s reputation, significant importance was attached to the defendant’s apology.
139 Accordingly:
"I have already held that the apology was sufficient to eradicate or at least minimise any unfavourable
impression created by the original article in the mind of the hypothetical reasonable reader who read
both." 140
Secondly, Bean J considered the meaning of "has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the
reputation of the claimant". On this issue, Bean J confirmed that he preferred the claimant’s
submission that the relevant point in time to assess whether serious harm has been caused is the
date on which the claim is issued.141 Determining whether there is serious harm at this point means
that a defendant, such as a newspaper, can publish a defamatory statement, whether knowingly,
recklessly or innocently, and then quickly follow the publication with a prominent and unequivocal
apology. On Bean J’s analysis, so long as no proceedings have been issued, the apology will prevent
liability from crystallising as, pursuant to this interpretation, serious harm will not have occurred in
accordance with the s.1(1) test. Consequently, any claimant who continues with proceedings in light
of an appropriate apology will do so at significant risk of incurring costs. This position could add fuel to
the new inequality of arms argument advanced in this article. Although, pursuant to this judgment, an
appropriate apology may "repair" any serious harm caused, arguably, this is not, in reality, the case. It
is submitted that, quite conceivably, a defendant newspaper, for instance, could purposely publish a
defamatory statement, reap the financial reward that ensues from its sales, and then promptly print an
apology, preventing liability from arising.
Incidentally, the Explanatory Notes are equally as vague with regard to serious financial loss, stating
that: *J.B.L. 327
"Subsection (2) reflects the fact that bodies trading for profit are already prevented from claiming
damages for certain types of harm such as injury to feelings, and are in practice likely to have to show
actual or likely financial loss. The requirement that this be serious is consistent with the new serious
harm test in subsection (1)." 142
Thus, the Lord Chancellor’s opinion, the only judicial interpretation to date and the Act’s Explanatory
Notes are vague and cursory at best, as none provide any guidance as to what is meant by
"damaged". For instance, could actual or likely serious harm derive from a decline in a company’s
share price?
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Demonstrating actual or likely serious financial loss
Demonstrating a decline in share price to show actual or likely serious financial loss as a result of a
defamatory statement is subject to conflicting schools of thought. During the House of Commons
Parliamentary Debate on the Defamation Bill, the Public Bill Committee debated whether a decline in
a company’s share price should be evidence of serious financial loss. Jonathan Djanogly was of the
opinion that:
"In order to satisfy the serious harm test … Given the potential effect on shareholders and
management, we see no reason why there should be no redress for a defamatory action that has
caused a fall in share price." 143
Support for this view can be garnered from Holroyd Pearce LJ’s judgment in Lewis v Daily Telegraph
Ltd 144:
"The plaintiffs or their accountants could produce figures of turnover and graphs showing any sudden
downward tendency, such as, for instance, that in the week after the libel orders noticeably declined
and so forth … Evidence could be called to show that the price of the shares in the stock market had
declined." 145
Rose LJ’s judgment146 in McCarthy Stone Plc v Daily Telegraph 147 also supports Djanogly’s assertion.
His Lordship accepted that evidence of a decline in share price, for the purpose of inferring causation,
may be relevant to goodwill and special damages.148
However, to the contrary, during the debate, Paul Farrelly argued:
"[W]hether share prices, which go up and down, can be used to establish real loss of reputation. I am
afraid that real loss of reputation is demonstrated by an effect on the underlying business. If there is
no such effect, in the medium and long run—or the very short run—share prices recover. Nestlé
suffered grave damage to reputation in the milk powder situation. Where companies *J.B.L. 328
genuinely suffer, it can be seen in their profit and loss and sales. That is where the case must be
made." 149
Farrelly’s argument reflects Dillon LJ’s judgment in Lonrho v Fayed (No.5),150 in which, according to
Tugendhat J in Collins Stewart v Financial Times (No.1),151 his Lordship answered the following
question in the negative: "do fluctuations in the share price of a company reflect its goodwill and
reputation?"152 Indeed, in Collins Stewart the Financial Times argued successfully that using an
alleged decline in share price as evidence of financial loss lacked certainty and precision.153
In practice, for individual claimants, the courts are likely to use the tests under the common law
regime as a starting point for determining serious harm, as the new test only raises the threshold
modestly. The number of times a defamatory statement has been published and in what format will
also be fundamental factors. As for the utilisation of share prices, there remains uncertainty. Although
Lewis and McCarthy go some way to support the application of a decline in share price as evidence
of serious financial loss, it is submitted that these authorities may well be usurped by the more recent
judgments in Lonrho and Collins Stewart owing to an acute issue with causation.154 Establishing a
causative link between a defamatory statement and a drop in share price would, arguably, be
unjusticiable, or, as is discussed in the following section, at the very least open to strong arguments of
remoteness, allied to a lack of certainty and precision, as many variable factors can impact upon
share valuation at any given time.155
Applying actual or likely serious financial loss to reputation as property and
reputation as honour
The position for corporate claimants is less clear than it is for individuals. Establishing serious
financial loss, whether actual or likely, where reputation as property is concerned, should be more
straightforward than situations involving reputation as honour. Reputation as property will be
considered first, followed by reputation as honour.
Reputation as property156 —establishing causation
In theory, establishing a serious financial loss to a company due to damage caused to a valuable
commercial asset should, in practice, be relatively easily achievable for any corporate claimant. There
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are, as has been discussed above, mechanisms in place for measuring the value of corporate
reputation.157 However, it is submitted that there are two particular issues which, in some instances,
may prove impossible for corporate claimants to overcome.
First, the claimant will need to establish causation by demonstrating that the defamatory statement
caused or is likely to cause the loss. This would not be an *J.B.L. 329 issue where, for example,
there is one statement clearly linked to an immediate drop in revenue. However, difficulty arises
where a loss has been caused by a number of statements, only one of which is defamatory. In this
example, in order to establish causation, the claimant would have to prove that the single defamatory
statement caused or is likely to cause "a" serious financial loss. The second issue is quantifying the
loss caused, or likely to be caused, from that individual defamatory statement. Thus, in this example,
it may prove impossible for a company to separate what loss is linked to the defamatory statement
and what is linked to other, legitimate damage, to its reputation. This acute issue with causation is
illustrated by Tesla Motors v BBC.158 Although this case mainly concerned malicious falsehood, the
judgment of Moore-Bick LJ deals with causation of financial harm from a number of statements, some
of which were defamatory and untrue, and others that were "defamatory" but true (and accepted as
such), and is therefore pertinent to the observations above. According to his Lordship:
"I do not think that there is any real prospect of Tesla’s being able to demonstrate at trial that it has
suffered any quantifiable loss by reason of any of the actionable statements. Again, this difficulty is
one of establishing that any particular loss was caused by one or more of the actionable falsehoods
rather than by one or more of the statements that are not actionable." 159
Secondly, harm caused to a company’s reputation can have a catastrophic impact on its financial
performance.160 However, serious financial loss to one company would be a minor dent on the
balance sheet of another. Quantifying serious financial loss in any case, particularly where that loss is
potential as opposed to real, will be difficult. No guidelines have been provided to attempt to ensure
parity and consistency among claimants and cases in the quantification process. It is submitted that,
over time, the courts may adopt a percentage approach, whereby only losses or potential losses
meeting a percentage threshold will be considered serious. However, until a threshold is established
by case law, corporate claimants will remain unclear as to when the right to reputation has been
contravened, whereas the right to freedom of expression will enjoy far more, and arguably
disproportionate, appreciation. A practical observation by Moore-Bick LJ in Tesla articulates this
situation. His Lordship was of the opinion that the proceedings instigated by Tesla added to the
negative press derived from the defamatory statements. In essence, his Lordship was of the opinion
that by bringing the claim, Tesla made the situation worse.161 Thus, in some instances, corporate
claimants will be in the unfortunate position of not only facing a protracted and costly challenge to
establish a causative link between a statement and their actual or likely financial loss, but may also
suffer further negative publicity as a result of an attempt to vindicate their reputation. *J.B.L. 330
Reputation as honour—establishing causation
As has been discussed above, reputation as honour is as capable of being defamed as reputation as
property,162 owing, to a large extent, to an ever greater emphasis being placed by companies on CSR
activities.163 It is submitted that the requirement to establish serious financial loss, whether actual or
likely, will prevent companies from pursuing legitimate claims where reputation as honour has been
damaged.
For example, a company may undertake not-for-profit activities as part of its CSR policy. A
defamatory statement in relation to these not-for-profit activities may not cause quantifiable serious
financial loss or indeed any financial loss at all, actual or likely. In any event, establishing causation
for any such actual or potential loss would, it is submitted, be either practically impossible, or
uneconomical. The loss the company incurs may not be financial at all, but could still affect it in its
"way of its business", as identified by Lord Keith in Derbyshire.164 Instead, for example, the loss may
manifest as an inability to continue certain CSR activities, which may, in turn, impact upon the
company’s ability to attract and recruit talented employees.165 This point is illustrated by returning to
the 2014 Global RepTrak 100 Report, which states that 70 per cent of those interviewed would want
to work for a company with a RepTrak score of 80 or above, and 78 per cent would welcome the
company into their local community, whereas, for instance, only 16 per cent of interviewees would
want to work for a company with a score of 40–49.166 Incidentally, a damaged reputation could also
interfere with marketing campaigns or staff development plans.167
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The BBC was used to illustrate similar concerns raised by Sir Edward Garnier during the House of
Commons debate on the eve of the Act’s enactment.168 The BBC is a corporation that trades for profit.
The quality and content of its programmes relate to its reputation as property. However, it also has
reputation as honour: it is a source of unbiased news reporting; it supports charities such as Children
in Need; and it is a reputable employer. The BBC could be defamed in its trading capacity and it
could, subject to the issues discussed above, bring a successful defamation claim through the vehicle
of reputation as property. On the other hand, as suggested by Sir Edward Garnier, if it were accused
of being "a hotbed of or a magnet for child sex abusers"169 it would not necessarily be caused, or likely
to be caused, serious financial loss. However, notwithstanding any application of the defence of
honest opinion pursuant to s.3 of the 2013 Act, or fair comment, it could, potentially, be defamed, and
its reputation as a place to *J.B.L. 331 work and visit could be damaged. Thus, despite the fact that
in this example the BBC could be caused serious reputational loss, vindicating its reputation under
the 2013 Act would, it is submitted, prove problematic, prolonged and costly.170 Indeed, as discussed
above with regard to reputation as property, Moore-Bick LJ’s observation in Tesla is particularly
pertinent, as any attempt to vindicate reputation may expose the claimant to further negative publicity,
which sequentially could result in a further deterioration in reputation. Demonstrating actual or likely
serious financial loss in these circumstances may only be achieved by, for example, establishing a
link between the statement and consequent inability to recruit suitably talented employees which, in
turn, results in actual or likely serious financial loss. Evidentially this would be hugely challenging,
and, it is submitted, is akin to establishing actual or likely serious financial loss by virtue of a decline in
share price. As such, it is subject to the same issues of remoteness, reliability and certainty, owing to
the number of variable factors that would be involved, for example: establishing that a potential
employee chose to look elsewhere for employment because of the defamatory statement; or that an
employee’s performance is below that of a potential employee who would have applied for a position
within the company, but for the statement, and that performance shortfall has had, or is likely to have,
a negative financial impact.
A new inequality of arms?
It is submitted that the issues outlined above are clearly concerning, particularly where reputation as
honour is concerned. The Ministry of Justice’s misgivings about the insertion of a requirement to
prove actual or likely financial loss171 is reflected in Chan’s argument that not all corporations that
have been subject to alleged defamatory imputations are in a sufficient financial position to fund
prolonged litigation, even if they have a realistic prospect of succeeding.172 To the contrary, not all
defendants are financially disadvantaged. They may, at times, include large media corporations.173
Indeed, in McDonalds v Steel and Morris 174 Pill LJ argued that:
"Some corporations may be very powerful commercially and in homely terms well able to look after
themselves. But we consider there is no principled basis upon which a line may be drawn between
strong corporations and weaker corporations …." 175
Where, as envisaged by Chan, the defendant is a large media corporation and the claimant is a small
company,176 there is, arguably, significant potential for the serious harm requirement, and the serious
financial loss qualification, to tilt the balance in favour of the right to freedom of expression, to the
disproportionate disadvantage of the right to corporate reputation, thus creating a new inequality of
arms. It is submitted that this added complexity of proving actual or likely *J.B.L. 332 serious
financial loss is going to lengthen litigation further. The acute difficulty with establishing causation will
lead to corporate claimants facing the prospect of having their claims struck out, owing to their being
no reasonable grounds disclosed for bringing the claim, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a). Equally, as with
Tesla ’s claim for special damages, claimants will be exposed to CPR 24.2 applications for summary
judgment, on the basis that there is no real prospect of being able to demonstrate at trial that it has
suffered any quantifiable loss by reason of actionable statements.177
Consequently, the threat of increasingly protracted litigation, and the sheer complexity of establishing
that the serious harm caused to the company’s reputation emanated from a particular statement, will
deter some companies, particularly smaller entities, from pursuing a defamation claim, even if they
have a realistic (or better) prospect of succeeding, owing to the costs involved and the resources
required. The position is worse for corporate claimants where their reputation as honour has been
defamed. In these situations it will be almost practically impossible, or simply uneconomical, to
vindicate reputation.
This may mean that more claims will come from individuals associated with the respective "defamed"
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company, for example the chief executive officer (CEO), or an individual named in the alleged
defamatory statement. In this instance, theoretically, the individual could argue that the statement
identified and defamed them, unless the statement made it clear that the allegation only criticised the
company, as opposed to any individual. It is submitted that this is more likely with smaller companies
where individuals are more closely associated with the company itself. By doing this, the serious
financial loss requirement is circumvented, although the individual would still have to satisfy the
serious harm requirement.178 This is not an ideal situation for two reasons. First, if the individual is
successful, damages may be recovered. However, because the action would have been brought by
the individual, rather than the company, its reputation will, arguably, not have been explicitly
vindicated. Secondly, claims brought by an individual, such as the CEO, effectively suing to seek
vindication of the company’s reputation, may be treated by the courts as an abuse of process.179
Conclusion
This article has confirmed that reputation is extremely valuable to corporations. Both the concepts of
reputation as property and reputation as honour legitimise the protection of corporate reputation as a
valuable asset that, in the case of the latter, does not always manifest in financial gain or loss to a
company. This notion was recognised by Lord Keith in Derbyshire 180 and also by Members of
Parliament during the passage of the Defamation Bill through the House of Commons and House of
Lords. *J.B.L. 333 181
In Steel and Morris the European Court of Human Rights clearly recognised the value of corporate
reputation, as it identified a public interest in protecting the commercial success and viability of
companies, for the benefit of shareholders and employees, and also for the wider economy.182
Corporate reputation is not only valuable to the company itself and its shareholders. As illustrated by
s.172(1)(d) and (e) of the Companies Act 2006, reputation is clearly linked to the performance of
companies. In turn, it is submitted that this performance directly impacts upon the condition of the
wider economy, the socio-economic mobilisation of communities, the environment, education and
sustainability.
The inclusion of the requirement to prove serious harm, by demonstrating actual or likely serious
financial loss, has the potential to undermine the value of corporate reputation, not only to companies,
but also to the wider economy. Thus, Lord McNally’s desire for "legislation that works"183 may, as a
result of this requirement amount to a double-edged sword. On the one side it may decrease
unmeritorious claims being brought by claimants.184 Conversely, this article has shown that, in many
plausible instances, companies will not be able to vindicate their reputation, despite having legitimate
claims, as they will not be able to demonstrate actual or likely serious financial loss, or will struggle to
establish a causal link between a defamatory allegation and a quantifiable loss. Because of these
causation issues, the new higher threshold may mean this category of claimant is subjected to
increased criticism. This would be due to those responsible for the criticism being, first, less
concerned that a claimant would even bother to issue proceedings against them, and, secondly, the
ability of the claimant to overcome CPR 3.4 and 24.2, should it progress to this stage. This
unsatisfactory position could lead to irresponsible reporting and broadcasting, and, potentially,
unresearched, spurious comments. If the new regime effectively grants impunity to unjustified
defamatory statements, legitimate and justified criticism may be devalued as the public, unable to
separate the two, may take the latter less seriously.
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